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FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 415 AND PAULA
CORBIN JONES V. WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON:
THE USE OF PROPENSITY EVIDENCE IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT SUITS
DANIEL L. OvERBEY
The phone call was every plaintiff attorney's dream -
another woman was coming forward who had been sexually
harassed by the defendant.1 Before this call Joseph Cammarata
had little more than Paula Corbin Jones' disputed testimony to
convince a jury that she had been sexually harassed by then-Gov-
ernor William Jefferson Clinton.
According to Cammarata, the caller was Kathleen E. Willey,
a former volunteer in the White House social office. "I had a
similar thing happen to me in 1993," she said.2 The events are
hotly disputed. Cammarata's version is that on November 29,
1993, Willey went to the Oval Office to ask Clinton to help her
get a full-time, payingjob. He took her into a private office adja-
cent to the Oval Office and "kissed and fondled her."3 A witness
who claims to have seen her as she left the Oval Office described
her as "disheveled. Her face was red and her lipstick was off. She
was flustered, happy and joyful."4 Another witness initially told
Newsweek that a distraught Willey had told her about the incident
on the night it occurred. This same witness later recanted, tell-
ing Newsweek that Willey had "asked her to lie about what hap-
pened, in order to give credibility to the allegation that she had
been harassed."5 While it is unclear what, if anything, occurred
in the President's office on November 29, 1993, it is known that
Willey got a paying job in the White House office in December
1993.6
* B.A., 1983, Rollins College; J.D., 1998, Notre Dame Law School;
Thomas J. White Scholar, 1996-1998. The author thanks Professors John
Robinson and G. Robert Blakey for their assistance with this article.
1. See Michael Isikoff, A Twist in Jones v. Clinton, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11,
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Although Willey has denied calling Cammarata and claims
to have no information relevant to the case, Cammarata has sub-
poenaed her.7 If she or other witnesses were to testify that Clin-
ton had sexually harassed them, it could strongly bolster Jones'
case. Hearing such testimony, the jury could conclude that it is
unlikely that several women would fabricate such charges. They
could also conclude that Clinton has a predisposition toward
such conduct and is thus more likely than the average person to
have committed sexual harassment. Prior to 1995, such evidence
would have been inadmissible. Dramatic changes in the Federal
Rules of Evidence have made it likely that such evidence is now
admissible.
In 1995, Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414 and 415,
enacted by Congress as part of the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994,8 became effective. These rules
address the admissibility of evidence of similar acts in sexual
assault-related prosecutions and civil actions.
Rule 413 makes admissible evidence of similar acts in sexual
assault cases.9 It requires that the government disclose any evi-
dence it intends to offer to the defendant at least fifteen days
before the scheduled date of trial, or later upon leave of the
court for good cause.1" Similar acts are defined as "offenses of
sexual assault" which are further defined to include enumerated
state and federal offenses.11
Rule 414 makes admissible evidence of similar acts in child
molestation cases.12 Its provisions regarding disclosure are the
same as Rule 413,13 and it similarly defines "offense of child
molestation" to include enumerated state and federal offenses. 14
Rule 415 provides that evidence of similar acts of sexual
assault and child molestation is also admissible in civil cases
where a claim for damages or other relief depends upon a party's
having committed such an assault.15 The rule also requires dis-
closure fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial, or later
upon leave of the court for good cause.
1 6
7. Prior to publication of this article, Willey was deposed. Although a gag
order is in effect, news reports claim that she confirmed that the incident with
Clinton did occur.
8. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
9. See FED. R. EVID. 413.
10. See FED. R. EVID. 413(b).
11. See FED. R. EvD. 413(d).
12. See FED. R. EvID. 414.
13. See FED. R. EXqD. 414(b).
14. See FED. R. EvID. 414(d).
15. See FED. R. EVID. 415.
16. See FED. R. EVID. 415(b).
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From the time they were first proposed in 1991, the new
rules have generated a plethora of commentary.1 7 Scholars and
courts alike are wrestling with the proper interpretation and
application of the rules. This article seeks to highlight some of
these problems by showing how they might affect the outcome of
Jones v. Clinton should the case ultimately be tried.
I. THE LAW OF EVIDENCE BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF RULE 415
Circumstantial use of character evidence, that is, using evi-
dence of character in any form - reputation, opinion from
observation, or specific acts - to show that a person acted in a
particular manner on a specific occasion is generally prohibited
by Rule 404(a). a An exception is contained in Rule 404(a)
which permits a defendant to introduce evidence of a pertinent
character trait.19 However, the committee notes are unequivocal
that this exception does not apply in civil cases.2 ° Thus, under
Rule 404(a), the defendant in a civil case cannot introduce any
evidence of his character, no matter how probative it may be, to
show his lack of propensity to commit the act for which he is
being accused.
The plaintiff, however, is not barred by Rule 404(a) from
getting before the jury evidence of the defendant's character,
provided it is introduced for a purpose other than showing pro-
pensity to commit the alleged offense.21 Acceptable purposes
include, but are not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mis-
take or accident.22 When evidence of character is admitted for
these purposes, it is subject to Rule 403.23 Even if relevant, the
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury.24
17. See, e.g., James J. Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of
Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95
(1994); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American
Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the
Right Foot, 22 FoRDHAM UPB. L.J. 285 (1995).
18. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 188
(Edward G. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
19. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (1).
20. See FED. R. EID. 404 advisory committee's note.
21. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
22. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
23. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
24. See FED. R. EID. 403.
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In this context, Rule 415 has essentially overturned Rule 404
and makes evidence of a defendant's past, similar acts routinely
admissible in civil cases predicated on accusations of sexual
impropriety.
II. RULE 415
The text of Rule 415 provides:
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other
relief is predicated on a party's alleged commission of con-
duct constituting an offense of sexual assault or child
molestation, evidence of that party's commission of
another offense or offenses of sexual assault or child
molestation is admissible and may be considered as pro-
vided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules.
25
(b) A party who intends to offer evidence under this Rule
shall disclose the evidence to the party against whom it will
be offered, including statements of witnesses or a summary
of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be
offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of
trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good
cause.
26
A. The History of Rule 415
The new rules were first proposed by Senator Robert Dole
and Representative Susan Molinari in 1991 as part of the
Women's Equal Opportunity Act.27 They were later reintro-
duced as part of the Sexual Assault Prevention Act bills of the
102nd Congress, 28 and included in President Bush's Compre-
hensive Violent Crime Control Act of 1991.29 They did not
emerge as Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414 and 415 until pas-
sage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994.30
25. Rules 413 and 414 provide that such evidence "may be considered for
its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." FED. R. EVID. 413(a); FED. R.
EvID. 414(a).
26. FED. R. EVID. 415.
27. S. 472, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 231 (1991), H.R. 1149, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 231 (1991), 137 CONG. REc. S2197 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1991).
28. S. 3271, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 121 (1992), H.R. 5960, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 121 (1992), 138 CONG. REc. S15,163-64 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1992).
29. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 801 (1991), 137 CONG. REc. S3212
(daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
30. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
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Key to the inclusion of the new rules was Representative
Molinari, who joined a coalition of Congressmen blocking pas-
sage of the Act until the new rules were included.3' Molinari
touted the new rules as a "triumph for the public - for the
women who will not be raped and the children who will not be
molested.32 Not everyone shared her enthusiasm. Representa-
,five William Hughes of NewJersey, speaking just before Molinari,
called the proposed rules "absolutely awful"33 and questioned
their constitutionality. 34 Former New York City Mayor Ed Koch
described the process leading up to the inclusion of the new
rules as "disgraceful."35
Neither the congressional opposition nor the pending rec-
ommendations of the Judicial Conference deterred Molinari.
"[R] egardless of what the judicial conference may recommend,
the new rules will take effect within at most 300 days of the enact-
ment of this legislation unless repealed or modified by subse-
quent legislation."36 Molinari was referring to section 320935 of
the Act which invited the Judicial Conference of the United
States within 150 days to submit "a report containing recommen-
dations for amending the Federal Rules of Evidence as they
affect the admission of evidence of a defendant's prior sexual
assault or child molestation crimes in cases involving sexual
assault and child molestation."37
Speaking just prior to Molinari, Representative Hughes had
entered into the record, along with his own acerbic comments, a
letter from Alicemarie Stotler, chair of the Committee of Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Federal Judicial Conference,
opposing the new rules.38 The Judicial Conference transmitted a
formal report to Congress on February 9, 1995, describing its
opposition to the new rules, and making recommendations for
different amendments. 3 9 Congress, however, took no action on
31. For a detailed description of the events leading up to the passage of
the bill on August 21, 1994, see Duane, supra note 17, at 95-97.
32. 140 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari).
33. Id. at H8989 (statement of Rep. Hughes).
34. See id. at H8990.
35. Charles V. Zehren, 2 NY Reps Turned Tide, NEWSDAY, Aug. 23, 1994, at
A19.
36. 140 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari).
37. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320935(e), 108 Stat. 1796, 2137 (1994).
38. See 140 CONG. REc. H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Hughes).
39. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE
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the Judicial Conference's recommendations and the new rules
became effective on July 9, 1995.
The inclusion of Rule 415 remains shrouded in the history
of the new rules. It first appeared in 1991, when the rules were
introduced by Senator Dole as part of the Women's Equal
Opportunity Act.4" A detailed analysis of the new rules was pre-
pared by the Department of Justice and transmitted to Congress
on March 13, 1991.41
B. The Department of Justice's Position
"The new rules are responsive to deficiencies in the existing
rules of evidence, and the Department of Justice strongly sup-
ports their enactment."42 The Department of Justice (DOJ) pos-
ited the "entirely sound perception that evidence of this type is
frequently of critical importance in establishing . . . guilt of a
rapist or child molester and that concealing it from the jury often
carries a grave risk that such a criminal will be turned loose to
claim other victims."43 The importance of such evidence, accord-
ing to the DOJ, derives from the "doctrine of chances." This doc-
trine maintains that it is unlikely that a defendant would be
repeatedly the subject of false accusations.44 As the Department
contended:
It is inherently improbable that a person whose prior acts
show that he is in fact a rapist or child molester would have
the bad luck to be later hit with a false accusation of com-
mitting the same type of crime, or that a person would for-
IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (1995), reprinted in 159 F.R.D. 51, 51-54
(1995).
40. See S. 472, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 231 (1991), H.R. 1149, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 231 (1991), 137 CONG. REC. S2197 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1991).
41. See COMPREHENSIVE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1991 SECrION-By-
SECTION ANALYSIS, reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. S3238-42 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991)
[hereinafter SECTION By SECTION ANALYSIS]. While it would later be cited as
part of a comprehensive analysis of the new rules, see 140 CONG. REc. H8991
(daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari), it was actually a one-
sided defense of the rules by the very department that drafted them. Rule 415
is mentioned only in the introduction. Nowhere in the following pages is there
any treatment of Rule 415. Furthermore, the justifications that are posited for
Rule 413 and Rule 414 do not apply largely to civil actions.
42. Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Robert Dole, Minority Leader (Apr. 24, 1991), in 137
CONG. REC. S4927 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1991). It is no surprise that the Justice
Department "strongly support[ed]" the new rules - they drafted them.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., EDWARDJ. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
§§ 4-5 (1996).
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tuitously be subject to multiple false accusations by a
number of different victims.
45
While acknowledging that Rule 404(b) already permits the
introduction of similar acts evidence to establish the defendant's
identity and intent, the DOJ went on to insist that such evidence
should also be admissible to establish "consent" and that the
alleged event in fact occurred.4 6
Because many alleged sexual assaults occur without wit-
nesses, the defense will often be that the victim consented or that
the assault never occurred. These situations, according to the
DOJ, are where similar acts evidence is "likely to have a high
degree of probative value on grounds of probability."47 The DOJ
offers as an example a case where the defendant is charged with
rape and his defense is either that the event never occurred, or
that the victim consented. The testimony of a woman that the
defendant had previously committed an unreported rape would,
according to the DOJ, carry a "high degree of probative value"
because of the "improbability of multiple false charges" being
brought against the defendant.4"
The doctrine of chances is a noncharacter route for the
admission of evidence of bad acts. It does not say that a person is
bad and is, therefore, more likely to commit the current offense.
Rather, it says that the possibility of repeated unfounded accusals
is remote.4 9 The DOJ offers no empirical evidence to support
this claim of remoteness. Rather, it relies on "the strong support
of experience. '5 This "experience" includes citing cases where
the courts have stretched the application of Rule 404(b) to per-
mit the introduction of such evidence as an indication of "wide-
spread judicial support."5 1 In contrast, cases where courts have
applied 404(b) to exclude such evidence or reversed convictions
on appeal where such evidence was not excluded are cited as
"observable problems."52
The DOJ's other argument is a preemptive strike against
opponents of the new rules who might argue that it is unfair to
45. SECTION By SECTION ANALYsis, supra note 41, at S3240.
46. See id. at S3240-41.
47. Id. at 3241.
48. Id.
49. See American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report to the House of
Delegates, 22 FoRDHAM UPB. L.J. 343, 348-49 (1995) [hereinafter ABA Report].
50. Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Robert Dole, Minority Leader, supra note 42, at
S4927.
51. Id.
52. Id. at S4928.
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expand the evidence that can be admitted against defendants in
light of the restrictions that rape victim shield laws place on the
admission of the victim's prior conduct. Asserting that the "rules
of evidence do not generally aim at a superficial neutrality
between rules of admission affecting the victim and defendant,"
the DOJ maintains that there is a "basic difference in the proba-
tive value that is subject to exclusion under such rules."53
Prior sexual behavior of the victim will, according to the
DOJ, "at most [show] that she has engaged in some sexual activ-
ity prior to or outside the marriage - a circumstance that does
not distinguish her from most of the rest of the population." 4
But evidence that the defendant had committed prior rapes5"
"places him in a small class of depraved criminals" and is highly
probative of his guilt.5 6
A second distinction, according to the DOJ, is the rape
shield laws' "important purpose" of encouraging victims to
report sexual assaults. Limiting the admissibility of evidence of
the defendant's past sexual assaults, says the DOJ, does "not fur-
ther any comparable public purpose, because the defendant's
cooperation is not required to carry out the prosecution.
57
Finally, the DOJ asserts that defendants have little or no
right to privacy regarding alleged prior sexual misconduct.
"[V] iolent sex crimes are not private acts, and the defendant can
claim no legitimate interest in suppressing evidence that he has
engaged in such acts when it is relevant to the determination of a
later criminal charge."' 58 The DOJ makes no distinction between
violent sex crimes that may be charged in criminal cases and any
lesser actions that may serve as the predicate for a civil suit.
C. Congressional Support for the New Rules
While the DOJ was careful to focus on the noncharacterjus-
tifications for the new rules, Congress was not. Speaking in sup-
port of the new rules on the Senate floor, Senator Dole referred
to the "defendant's propensity to commit sexual assault" as well
as the doctrine of chances.59 Dole was unequivocal that the new
rules would overturn the current prohibition that Rule 404(b)
places on the use of character evidence. Dole argued that:
53. SECTION By SECTION ANALYsIs, supra note 41, at S3240.
54. Id. at 3241.
55. This includes previously unreported allegations from alleged victims.
56. SECTION By SECTION ANALYsis, supra note 41, at S3241.
57. Id.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. 140 CONG. REc. S12,990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Dole).
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[t]he new rules will supersede in sex offense cases the
restrictive aspects of Federal rule of evidence 404(b). In
contrast to Rule 404(b)'s general prohibition against evi-
dence of character or propensity, the new rules for sex
offense cases authorize admission and consideration of evi-
dence of an uncharged offense for its bearing 'on any mat-
ter to which it is relevant.' This includes the defendant's
propensity to commit sexual assault.
60
Representative Molinari made the same speech before the
House of Representatives on the eve of their vote. 6' Neither leg-
islator offered any evidence or explanation as to why propensity
evidence should be admitted in sexual assault cases when it is not
admitted in other types of cases. Although both referred to the
"distinctive character of the cases,"6 2 neither explained what
those characteristics are.
D. Congressional Opposition
Not everyone in the legislature shared Dole's and Molinari's
unfettered support for the new rules. Representative Hughes,
explaining that the current Rule 404(b) prohibited the use of
similar past conduct as evidence of current guilt, characterized
such evidence as "particularly inflammatory and thus potentially
prejudicial to the fact finding process."6 3 Such a procedure,
asserted Hughes, is "extremely bad public policy" which would
result in our "sinking into the star chamber procedures that have
long been rejected by civilized societies everywhere. '"64
Hughes was especially troubled by rules that would allow the
history of the defendant to be admitted, while the amendment to
Rule 412 that was being adopted at the same time would not per-
mit similar evidence to be admitted about the victim. This,
claimed Hughes, raised "very serious constitutional questions."65
Senator Joseph Biden was also strongly opposed to the new
rules. He argued that evidence that a person has been accused
of similar sexual offenses in the past has little or no probative
value as to whether they committed the offense with which they
are currently charged. The essence of our criminal justice sys-
60. Id.
61. See 140 CONG. REc. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Molinari).
62. Id. at H8991; 140 CONG. REc. S12,990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Dole).
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tern, according to Biden, is to ascertain whether a particular
defendant in a particular case is guilty of the charge that is
before the jury at that moment.66 Biden asserted:
This is not a fair thing to do to an individual because it
does not speak to the elements of the crime. It does not
speak to whether he was there at the place at the time and
moment and committed the crime.
67
Biden was especially concerned that such evidence would be mis-
used by the jury. He feared that they would conclude that the
prior acts mean the defendant is a "bad person" and convict him
for that reason, rather than because they actually believed that
he was guilty of the offense before them.6"
E. The Judicial Conference
Under the Rules Enabling Act, 69 the Federal Judicial Confer-
ence (FJC) develops and proposes changes in the Federal Rules.
These proposals are submitted to the Supreme Court for
approval. If the Supreme Court approves the proposals, they are
submitted to Congress. The proposed changes go into effect six
months later if they are not rejected or modified by Congress.7"
The FJC establishes committees made up of federal and state
court judges, constitutional scholars and members of the bar.
One such committee is the Committee of Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference. At the time the new rules
were being adopted by Congress, Alicemarie Stotler chaired the
committee. She sent a letter opposing the new rules to Repre-
sentative Brooks which was entered into the Congressional Rec-
ord.7 On February 9, 1995, the FJC submitted a formal report to
Congress opposing the new rules.72
The FJC expressed concern that the new rules would greatly
diminish the protection from prejudice that the current rules
provide for criminal defendants and parties in civil cases. The
committee feared that a verdict could be based on past behavior
or for being a "bad person" rather than the evidence in the cur-
rent case. Judging on "bad acts" assumes that there is a direct
correlation between prior and current behavior. According to
66. See 139 CONG. REC. S15,072-73 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of
Sen. Biden).
67. Id. at S15,072.
68. See id. at S15,073.
69. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994).
70. See id. § 2074.
71. See 140 CONG. REC. H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Hughes).
72. SeeJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 39.
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the FJC, this core assumption of the new rules is not supported
by empirical evidence.
73
Another concern of the FJC was the potential for the new
rules to complicate litigation. Because the new rules do not limit
the admissible evidence to prior convictions, actions that did not
lead to convictions, even actions that were never previously
reported could be used. The result will be "mini-trials" within
the main trial where each previous bad act is litigated when the
defendant seeks to rebut such evidence.'4
The FJC also expressed serious reservation over the applica-
bility of Rule 403 which permits the judge to exclude evidence
when its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudi-
cial effect.75 Under Rule 415, evidence of similar acts "is admissi-
ble.' 76 Like other commentators, the FJC saw the phrase "is
admissible" to indicate that the new rules are mandatory." If so,
the evidence must be admitted regardless of other rules of evi-
dence such as the hearsay rule or the Rule 403 balancing test.
The FJC opposition to the new rules was unanimous, except for
the dissenting vote of the representative from the DOJ.
F. The American Bar Association
Like the FJC, the American Bar Association (ABA) opposed
the new rules.' 8 Ignoring the rulemaking structure whenever a
rule is likely to generate controversy, said the ABA, subverts the
"entire integrity of the Rules Enabling Act."' 9  The ABA
expressed several reservations about the new rules, including
their ambiguous wording and their admission of propensity evi-
dence to prove guilt."0
Juries, according to the ABA, may be overwhelmed by emo-
tional responses when they are presented with propensity evi-
dence. They may be less likely to apply the appropriate standard
of proof, feeling "less responsibility for convicting an individual
73. See id. at 52.
74. See id at 53.
75. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
76. FED. R. EVID. 415(a).
77. SeeJUDIClaL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 39, at 53.
78. ABA Report, supra note 49, at 343 ("RESOLVED, that the American
Bar Association opposes the substance of Rules 413, 414, and 415 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence concerning the admission of evidence in sexual
assault and child molestation cases, as enacted by the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103 - 322, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994).").
79. Id. at 345.
80. See id. at 344-45.
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who they know has committed previous bad acts. Ultimately the
jury may reach its verdict without deciding the defendant's guilt
in the present case." 81
III. RULE 415 AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
And finally, Mr. President, this amendment would create a
new Rule 415, making it clear that in civil cases, evidence
of a defendant's commission of past offenses of sexual
assault and child molestation is admissible and may be con-
sidered for whatever purpose is relevant.82
Rule 415 applies to civil cases in which a claim for damages
is predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct consti-
tuting an offense of sexual assault or child molestation." "Sex-
ual assault" evokes emotional responses which suggest that those
who sponsored the rules may not have understood what they
were proposing. Senator Dole spoke of "vicious sex crime
offenders,"84 and Representative Molinari of the "women who
will not be raped and the children who will not be molested."85
No one spoke of the true breadth of the rules. Neither person
mentioned nor seemed to realize that much more innocuous
behavior was included in the definition.86
A. Offense of Sexual Assault
Rule 413(d) defines sexual assault "for the purposes of this
rule and Rule 415" as a crime under federal law or the law of a
state that involves:
(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United
States Code,
(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the
defendant's body or an object and the genitals or anus of
another person;
(3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus
of the defendant and any part of another person's body;
81. Id. at 349.
82. 139 CONG. REC. S15,071 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Dole).
83. See FED. R. EvID. 415(a).
84. 139 CONG. REC. S15,071 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Dole).
85. 140 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari).
86. 23 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAm, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5412B (Supp. 1997) ("Rule 415 is not limited to the 'rapists'
that are featured prominently in the legislative history.").
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(4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the inflic-
tion of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another
person; or
(5) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct
described in paragraphs (1)-(4).87
Under federal law it is a crime to "cause[ ] another person to
engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that other per-
son in fear.""8 Further, it is a crime to engage in "abusive sexual
contact" under similar circumstances.8 9 "Sexual conduct" is
defined as "the intentional touching, either directly or through
the clothing, of the genitals, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person."9
In Frank v. County of Hudson,9 1 the first reported case
addressing Rule 415, the court held that Rule 415 is applicable
where the plaintiffs have included in their allegations "assaultive
behavior rather than mere verbal abuse or discriminatory treat-
ment."9 2 The magistrate below found that Rule 415 was not
applicable because the case was not predicated on the commission
of an offense of sexual assault. In reversing the magistrate's deci-
sion, the court made it clear that assaultive behavior need only
be one of the allegations, not the only or central one.93
In Cleveland v. KFC National Management Co.,94 the court held
that Rule 415 applied where there were "allegations of sexual
harassment that includes [sic] the touching of plaintiffs body in
an overt sexual manner."9 5 This position was also taken by the
court in Shea v. Galaxie Lumber & Construction Co.96 In granting a
motion in limine, the court held that Rule 415 was not applicable
because the alleged sexual harassment did not fit within the defi-
nition of "sexual assault," but left it open to the plaintiffs to offer
evidence that the "acts alleged fit within the definition contained
in Rule 412 [sic]." 9 7
87. FED. R. EVID. 413(d) (emphasis added).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2242(1) (1994).
89. See id. § 2244.
90. Id. § 2246(3) (emphasis added).
91. 924 F. Supp. 620 (D.N.J. 1996).
92. Id. at 625.
93. See id.
94. 948 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
95. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
96. 1996 WL 111890 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 1996).
97. Id. at *1.
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B. Is Admissible and May Be Considered
Rule 415 specifies that evidence of a defendant's prior sex-
ual misconduct "is admissible" but does not contain any explicit
language of limitation or exception. 98 The comments of Dole
and Molinari indicate that they believed that evidence which is
admissible under Rule 415 is still subject to the constraints of
Rule 403. As Molinari stated:
[i]n other respects, the general standards of the rules of
evidence will continue to apply, including the restrictions
on hearsay evidence and the court's authority under evi-
dence rule 403 to exclude evidence whose probative value
is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.99
This belief may be misplaced. Dole and Molinari apparently
read the "is admissible" language as though it were a conditional,
not compulsory phrase. °00 Compare this to Rule 412, which was
amended by the same legislation that adopted Rule 415. Under
Rule 412, evidence "is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under
these rules."10 1 Yet Dole and Molinari would read both statutes to
have the same effect - conditional, not compulsory admission of
the evidence. Such a loose statutory construction is inconsistent
with current Supreme Courtjurisprudence. Thus, either the ital-
icized portion of 412 is superfluous, or Dole and Molinari are
wrong. Recent Supreme Court decisions would seem to indicate
that they are wrong.
When interpreting statutes, the Court construes them
"where possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts
thereof."10 2 It generally presumes that Congress acts intention-
ally and purposefully when it "includes particular language in
one section of one statute but omits it in another."10 3 Thus,
courts should hesitate to conclude that "the differing language in
the two subsections has the same meaning in each."10 4 Applying
this analysis, Rule 415 should be read as to exempt itself from the
98. See FED. R. EVID. 415(a).
99. 140 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari).
100. See Duane, supra note 17, at 118-19.
101. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1) (emphasis added).
102. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991)
(citation omitted).
103. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338
(1994) (citation omitted).
104. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). In other words, "is
admissible" cannot be synonymous with "is admissible if it is otherwise
admissible under these rules." For a more detailed examination of this issue,
with additional citations, see Duane, supra note 17, at 118-20.
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limitations imposed by Rule 403. Thus, evidence is admissible
under Rule 415, even if its probative value is vastly outweighed by
its prejudicial effect.1"5
Not all writers agree with this interpretation of the applica-
bility of Rule 403. One author has even suggested that Rule 403
"may in fact prove to be the device which defines the boundaries
of Rule 413 [and the identical Rule 415]. ''1o6 This prophetic
interpretation is based, however, on the legislative history of the
new rules and is suspect in light of the Supreme Court's repeated
admonition that "[1] egislative history is irrelevant to the interpre-
tation of an unambiguous statute. '"107
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's admonition, the first
court to reach this issue held that Rule 415 does not trump Rule
403. Acknowledging that some commentators have interpreted
Rule 415 to "require a court to admit such evidence regardless of
its probative value and without analysis under FRE 403," the
court nonetheless held that evidence must "still be shown to be
relevant, probative and 'legally relevant' under FRE 403.
',108
At least one district court judge may not agree. In Galaxie,
the court granted a motion in limine after finding that Rule 415
was not applicable because the plaintiff had not alleged acts that
came within the definition of "sexual assault." 109 Thus, the court
relied on Rule 404(b) and Rule 403."10 However, the court gave
the plaintiff leave to proffer evidence that acts within the scope
of Rule 415 had occurred. In so doing, the court did not dispute
the plaintiffs suggestion that "Rule 415 trumps Rule 404(b) and
would make this evidence admissible." ' There would be no
reason for the court to permit the plaintiff to offer evidence to
bring Rule 415 into play if it were subservient to Rule 403 when
the court had already found that Rule 403 would keep the evi-
dence out. Thus, one reading of Galaxie is that Rule 404(b) is
controlled by Rule 403, but Rule 415 is not.
105. Other writers have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Duane,
supra note 17, at 118-20 (asserting that "is admissible" language trumps all other
rules of evidence).
106. Debra Sherman Tedeschi, Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 413:
Redistributing 'The Credibility Quotient', 57 U. Pirr. L. REv. 107, 123 (1995).
107. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808 n.3 (1989).
108. Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 624 (D.N.J. 1996)
("FRE 413-415 'are permissive rules of admissibility, not mandatory rules of
admission"') (quoting Memorandum from Department of Justice to United
States Attorneys 3 (July 12, 1995)).
109. See Shea v. Galaxie Lumber & Constr. Co., 1996 WL 111890, at *1
(N.D. I11. Mar. 12, 1996).
110. See id.
111. Id.
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No case involving Rule 415 has reached a United States
Court of Appeals. However, the Eighth Circuit recently
addressed the interplay between Rule 414 and Rule 403. In
United States v. Sumner,"2 the defendant appealed a conviction
for aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact. The dis-
trict court had admitted testimony from two children who
claimed to have been abused by the defendant. The evidence
was admitted under Rule 404(b) as evidence of intent."a 3 After
finding that the evidence was not admissible under Rule 404(b),
the court turned to the alternative grounds for admission that
had been proffered by the government - Rule 414. The court
opined:
The district court denied the government's proffer under
Rule 414, stating that the rule is unconstitutional because
it allows "any kind of evidence to show propensity" without
allowing for the application of the Rule 403 balancing test.
The court stated that it would have to read Rule 403 into
Rule 414 in order to provide a balancing test, which it
believed was contrary to Congress's intent."
4
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court's inter-
pretation. Citing the Second Circuit, the court held that a Rule
403 analysis of evidence offered under Rule 414 is consistent with
Congress' intent in enacting Rule 414.11 In a footnote, the
court stated that "[t] hree district courts have concluded that the
Rule 403 balancing test applies to Rule 413 and Rule 415."1 a
One of the three district court cases, Cleveland v. KFC National
Management Co.," 7 offers a unique interpretation of the interplay
between Rule 415 and Rule 403 that is actually contrary to the
Eighth Circuit's position."
8
In KFC, the plaintiffs, who had brought a sexual harassment
suit against KFC, sought to admit evidence of prior sexual mis-
conduct by one of KFC's managers."' The KFC court com-
mented that Rule 415 would "clearly apply" to admit evidence of
112. 119 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1997).
113. See id. at 659.
114. Id. at 661.
115. See id. at 661-62 (citing United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir.
1997)).
116. Id. at 662 n.3 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Guardia, 955
F. Supp. 115, 117 (D.N.M. 1997); Cleveland v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 948
F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620,
624 (D.N.J. 1996)).
117. 948 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
118. See id. at 64-66.
119. See id. at 64.
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the manager's prior acts against the company were this a case
where both the individual and the company were being sued.12 °
Moreover, while conceding that Rule 403 should apply, the court
offered a unique interpretation of the interplay between Rule
403 and Rule 415:
Rule 415 is tempered by Rule 403: evidence of defendant's
agent's misconduct must be both probative in that it
proves corporate knowledge of similar misconduct and it
must corroborate plaintiffs story; otherwise, the prejudicial
effect on the jury is not substantially outweighed.
121
Put another way, merely showing that the evidence of prior acts is
probative of the elements of the claim (knowledge, actual occur-
rence) creates an irrebutable presumption that the probative
value outweighs any prejudicial effect on the jury.
The KFC court's interpretation seems to be exactly what the
drafters and sponsors of the new rules were intending. Like the
KFC court, Senator Dole first stated that Rule 403 would still
apply to the new rules.122 He later receded from this position,
stating that the new rules created a "presumption" that exclusion
of evidence under Rule 403 would be "typically" improper.
1 23
According to Representative Molinari:
The underlying legislative judgment is that the evidence
admissible pursuant to the proposed rules is typically rele-
vant and probative, and that its probative value is normally
not outweighed by any risk of prejudice or other adverse
effects.
124
In other words, Rule 403's balancing test is presumed to be met
once the evidence is determined to meet the broad requirements
for admission under Rule 415. Once the evidence is admitted,
the jury may consider it for whatever purpose they choose.
1 25
120. See id. at 66. Only the corporation, not the manager, was a party to
the suit.
121. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
122. See 140 CONG. REc. S12,990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Dole); see also 140 CONG. REc. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Molinari).
123. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 86, § 5416.
124. 140 CONG. REc. H8992 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari).
125. See WRiGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 86, § 5416.
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C. Shall Not be Construed to Limit the Admissibility or
Consideration
Rule 415 "shall not be construed to limit the admission or
consideration of evidence under any other rule. 1 26 The only
purpose of this paragraph is to make clear that the rule does not
restrict other means by which the evidence may be admitted.
127
It does not imply, nor apparently was it meant to imply, that
other rules of evidence (such as Rule 403) would have any con-
trol over Rule 415.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF RULE 415 TO JONES V CLINrON
[Paula Jones had] first noticed Governor Clinton looking
at her as she manned a desk at the Governor's Quality
Management Conference in Little Rock that May of 1991.
At the time, Jones, 24, earned $6.65 an hour in a clerical
job with a state agency, the Arkansas Industrial Develop-
ment Commission. At about 2:30 p.m., she claims a state
trooper, Danny Ferguson, asked if she would accompany
him to the governor's suite. She asked Ferguson what Clin-
ton wanted, and the trooper replied, "It's OK, we do this
all the time for the governor." Jones hesitated, but she
went, she said, because she hoped the governor would give
her a job. (Ferguson later confirmed that he escorted
Jones to Clinton's room.) Jones says she entered the suite
and found herself alone with Clinton. She claims that the
governor began by saying that he was a good friend of
Jones's boss, Dave Harrington. Clinton complimented her
hair and her "curves," then began slipping his hands up
her legs, pulling her close to "nibble" her neck. "I will
never forget the look on his face," saidjones. "His face was
just red, beet red." Jones said she exclaimed "What are you
doing?" and pushed away from him. Clinton then walked
over to the sofa. According to Jones, as he sat down, he
lowered his trousers. "Kiss it," he said. Horrified, Jones
said she jumped up and announced, "Look, I'm not that
kind of girl." Clinton said, "Well, I don't want to make you
do anything you don't want to do." Clinton pulled up his
pants. He told her to keep quiet about the encounter.
1 28
126. FED. R. EVID. 415(c).
127. See SECTION By SECTION ANALYSIS, supra note 41, at S3240.
128. Evan Thomas & Daniel Klaidman, Clinton v. PaulaJones, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 13, 1997, at 26, 28.
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Based on these alleged events, Jones brought suit against
President Clinton under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and Arkan-
sas state law alleging, inter alia, that while he was governor of
Arkansas, he made "abhorrent" sexual advances to her, and that
her rejection of those advances led to punishment by her supervi-
sors in the state job she held at the time. 129 The Supreme Court
ultimately rejected President Clinton's claim of immunity and
the case has been set for trial.' Although there are witnesses
who verify thatJones went to Clinton's hotel room1 3 ' and others
who claim thatJones told them about the encounter shortly after
it happened, 13 2 no witness has come forward claiming to have
actually witnessed the alleged encounter. If this case eventually
reaches ajury, their decision may turn on whose version of events
they believe.
Jones' case will be bolstered if she can show the jury that
Clinton is somehow more likely than the average person to have
committed these acts. One way to accomplish this would be to
introduce evidence that Clinton has made similar sexual
advances towards other women. Such evidence, while ordinarily
not admissible, is admissible under Rule 415.
Rule 415 is not applicable unless the "claim for damages or
other relief is predicated on a party's alleged commission of con-
duct constituting an offense of sexual assault."'31 3 At first glance,
the events that may have occurred in then-Governor Clinton's
hotel room, while reproachable, do not appear to fall under Rule
415. However, the broad definition of "sexual assault" includes
touching, through the clothing, the "groin, breast, inner thigh or
buttocks ... with an intent to... gratify the sexual desire of any
person. '  Thus, Jones' version of the events arguably falls
within the broad definition of sexual assault contemplated by
Rule 415.1"5
The underlying principle behind the new rules is that evi-
dence of the commission of prior similar acts is somehow rele-
vant to the accused's liability in the current case. This principle
is broadly based on two widely divergent theories - propensity
and the doctrine of chances.
129. See Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1640 (1997).
130. See id. at 1651-52.
131. See Thomas & Klaidman, supra note 128, at 28.
132. See id.
133. FED. R. EVID. 415(a).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
135. Specifically, sexual assault could be said to have occurred when
Clinton allegedly "slipped his hand up her legs." Likewise, exposing his penis
and asking her to "kiss it" could be construed as an attempted sexual assault.
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The doctrine of chances is a noncharacter approach to prior
acts. It purports to make no statements or assumptions about the
character of the accused. Rather, it operates on the assumption
that "the accused has . . . become enmeshed in such circum-
stances more frequently than the ordinary incidence of such...
involvement."13 6 Put another way, other allegations against the
defendant increase the likelihood that the current allegation is
true:
If the defense disputes both the [current charge] and the
[other allegation], this typically amounts to a claim that
not just one, but two women have made false charges of
rape against the defendant. Here as well, the improbability
of multiple false charges normally gives similar crimes evi-
dence a high degree of probative value and supports its
admission.1
37
Early application of the doctrine of chances dealt with the
coincidence of repeated unusual events. In Rex v. Smith,13 1 the
defendant claimed that his wife accidentally drowned in her
bath. The English court admitted evidence that two other
women who had been married to the defendant had also died in
their baths.' 39 In such a case the probative value allegedly lies in
the remoteness of the possibility that a man would have three
wives accidentally drown in their baths.
Nor is the application of the doctrine of chances limited to
cases where there have been numerous recurrences of the unu-
sual event. In Oregon v. Allen, 4 ' the Supreme Court of Oregon
upheld the admissibility of one prior act of arson by the defend-
ant as logically relevant to whether he had committed the arson
for which he was currently accused. Citing the doctrine of
chances, the court concluded that the prior act was not offered
to prove character and was therefore admissible.' 41
Assuming, arguendo, that the doctrine of chances is probative
and its application in Smith and Allen is proper, what does this say
about its application in civil cases? It is fundamental to the out-
comes in Smith and Allen that the underlying "unusual event" had
occurred. In Smith, it was uncontroverted that the defendant's
136. EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, The Dispute Over the Doctrine of Chances, CRIM.
JusT., Fall 1992, at 16, 53.
137. Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Robert Dole, Minority Leader, supra note 42, at
S4928.
138. 11 Crim. App. 229 (1915).
139. See id. at 237.
140. 725 P.2d 331 (Or. 1986).
141. See id. at 334.
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three wives had drowned in their baths. In Allen, the defendant
had confessed to a prior arson. According to the DOJ and Sena-
tor Dole, the doctrine applies equally well when the underlying
"unusual event" is unproven, or even previously unreported. 42
The efficacy of the doctrine of chances as support for Rule
415 is diminished by two relevant distinctions between the previ-
ous applications of the doctrine to criminal cases, and its use in
sexual harassment civil suits.
A. The 'Unusual Events' Aren't So Uunusual
The rule does not require that the actions alleged in the suit
and the evidence offered be the same. It only requires that the
acts be assaultive behavior within the definition of the statutes.
Nor is there any time limitation on when the acts occurred.
While Senator Dole opined that an act that occurred ten years
prior "probably would not have any value[,]"' 45 the new rules
contain no time limitations.
The credibility of the doctrine of chances rests on the prem-
ise that the events are of such an unusual nature, such as three
drowned wives, that it is statistically improbable that a person
would become involved in more than one such incident. When
the evidence is prior uncharged acts, the premise is that the sta-
tistical probability is remote that a defendant would be falsely
accused on more than one occasion."' This may be true when
the accusations involve serious criminal acts such as rape, but is
dubious at best when applied to sexual harassment suits.
If President Clinton argues that he never committed the acts
described by the witnesses, the doctrine of chances would have
the jury consider the statistical probability that Clinton would be
falsely accused by two or more women. Yet Clinton was never the
subject of prior accusations. Not only was the alleged incident
involving Kathleen Willey never reported by Willey, it allegedly
occurred in 1993, two years after the Jones incident.
If Clinton admits that the "groping" occurred, the doctrine
of chances would have the jury consider the statistical probability
that a proven sex offender would later be the subject of a false
142. See Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Robert Dole, Minority Leader, supra note 43, at
S4928.
143. 139 CONG. REC. S15,073 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Dole).
144. See Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Robert Dole, Minority Leader, supra note 42, at
S4928.
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accusation of sexual assault. 45 The DOJ asserts that this type of
coincidence is "inherent[ly] improba[ble]. '"46 They do not,
however, provide any support to explain why it is "inherently
improbable." Paula Jones is seeking $700,000 in damages.
Arguably, if Jones has fabricated her complaint, she might be
more likely to bring an action against someone with a history of
such behavior. Likewise, Willey's accusations, which have sur-
faced four years after they allegedly occurred and at the height of
the Jones' controversy, are suspect for the same reasons.
B. The Evidence is Not Limited to Prior Convictions
Rule 415 does not restrict the sources from which the evi-
dence may be derived. The only requirement is that the prior
acts fall within the broadly prescribed category. They do not
have to be established by prior conviction or even supported by
having been previously reported. Jones' and Willey's accusations
were never reported to police. There were no first-hand wit-
nesses and there is little evidence beyond Willey's statements that
these acts occurred. Yet, according to the doctrine of chances,
their revelations are now somehow probative of Jones' veracity.
The jury is supposed to draw from Willey's accusations that it is
less likely that Jones is fabricating her story because others are
now making accusations against Clinton.
If prior accusations of sexual harassment have any probative
force, it comes from their independence. Accusations by unre-
lated parties made on separate occasions describing unrelated
but similar acts may have some relevance under the doctrine of
chances. That cannot be said for previously unreported, unver-
ifiable events, especially when the details have been the subject
of endless media coverage. The doctrine functions, if at all,
when the events relied on, whether they are occurrences or accu-
sations, are prior in time and independent in nature.
147
C. The "Lustful Disposition"
The second theory behind the new rules is the familiar, but
until now largely banned, use of propensity evidence. Rule
145. "Groping," if it involves touching the breasts or buttocks, even
through the clothing, can constitute sexual assault under federal law. See 18
U.S.C. § 2246(3) (1994); see also supra note 134 and accompanying text.
146. Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Robert Dole, Minority Leader, supra note 42, at
S4928.
147. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the Debate Over the
Proposed Legislation Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense
Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1125, 1130-32 (1993).
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404(b) explicitly prohibits the use of evidence of prior bad acts
to "prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith .. ."1" In contrast, the new rules
permit the use of such evidence "for its bearing 'on any matter to
which it is relevant.' This includes the defendant's propensity to
commit sexual assault.'
' 49
Proponents of the use of propensity evidence in the sexual
assault context argue that the defendant has a "lustful disposi-
tion" which somehow makes it more likely that he committed the
sexual offense that the plaintiff is seeking to prove.' 50 The DOJ
refers to the defendant as being of such a character as to "indi-
cate that the defendant has the unusual combination of aggres-
sive and sexual impulses that motivate the commission of such
crimes, and a lack of effective inhibitions against acting on such
impulses."' 5 ' This is appropriate, says the DOJ, because of the
"fairly obvious policy considerations"'152 that distinguish sex
offense cases.
What are the "fairly obvious policy considerations" impli-
cated by sex offenses? According to the DOJ, these offenses are
"secretive [in] nature" and lack "neutral witnesses. "1153 Many
crimes are committed in secret without witnesses. Why is the vic-
tim of a date rape more deserving of special treatment than the
wife who is murdered by an abusive husband? Neither crime may
be committed in the presence of witnesses. Yet, the rape victim is
available to testify. Further, there is a higher probability that the
rapist will have left trace evidence which bolsters the victim's
claim. 14
If not the nature of the crime, then perhaps something
about the perpetrators justifies the unique treatment under the
new rules. The DOJ says that they are a "small class of depraved
criminals." 1 5 This characterization may not be supported by the
facts. Recidivism rates are not higher for rapists or child molest-
148. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
149. 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari).
150. See ABA Report, supra note 49, at 351.
151. Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of




154. See Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 299-300.
155. Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Robert Dole, Minority Leader, supra note 42, at
S4928.
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ers than for other convicted criminals.' 56 The DOJ's own figures
show that the recidivism rate among rapists in 1983 was 7.7%,
while it was 33.5% for larcenists, 31.9% for burglars, 24.8% for
drug offenders, and 19.6% for robbers. 157 Yet the DOJ has not
proposed amending the rules to permit the use of propensity evi-
dence against any of those other offenders.
Despite the rhetoric surrounding it, the "lustful disposition"
argument is nothing more than "round[ing] up the regular sus-
pects." '158 This approach has long been rejected by scholars and
the courts. As the Supreme Court has stated:
The State may not show defendant's prior trouble with the
law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neigh-
bors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive
that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the
crime .... The overriding policy of excluding such evi-
dence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical
experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion
of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.' 5 9
The DOJ dismisses any concern that juries may misuse evi-
dence admitted under the new rules. In what may be the most
absurd use of circular logic to come out of this debate the DOJ
claimed that "there is no risk that evidence admitted under the
proposed new rules will be considered for a prohibited purpose,
since the [new] rules do not limit the purposes for which such
evidence may be considered."' 6 ° In other words, impermissible
uses can be avoided by making all uses permissible.
Propensity evidence invites the jury to infer that the defend-
ant is a bad person and from there to conclude that he is more
likely to have committed this bad act.' 6 ' Rule 415 gives a plain-
tiffs attorney the right "to ask the jury to deliberate over the
questions of the 'kind,' 'sort,' or 'type' of person the accused
156. See ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHiPLEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 at 6 tbl.9 (1989).
157. See id. The under-reporting of rape cannot justify this distinction.
Other crimes, such as drug offenses, which have considerably higher recidivism
rates are also greatly under-reported. See Katherine A. Baker, Once a Rapist?
Motivational Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HAgv. L. REv. 563, 579-80 (1997); see also
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 44, § 4:16 (citing additional studies that show
recidivism rates for rapists are equal to, or lower than the recidivism rates for
other crimes).
158. See ABA Report, supra note 49, at 349.
159. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); see
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.11 (1995).
160. SECTION By SECTION ANALYSIS, supra note 41, at 83242.
161. See Imwinkelried, supra note 136, at 18.
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is."1 62 Returning to Jones v. Clinton, Jones' attorney in closing
argument could tell the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, consider the evidence of the other
acts of sexual assault committed by Mr. Clinton. That evi-
dence shows you what type of person he is. This evidence
shows you that the accused is precisely the kind of vicious,
perverted person who would commit the sexual harass-
ment and assault that he's now on trial for. He is disposed
to sexual assault. Simply stated, he is a sex offender. He is
that sort of criminal, and that's exactly what he did in this
case. He has gotten away with this heinous behavior
before, don't let him get away with it this time.
163
The plaintiff's attorney has given the jury at least two reasons
(Jones and Willey) to return a verdict against Clinton. Even if
the jurors are not convinced that he assaulted Jones, they may
choose to use a verdict against him as a means of punishing him
for the incident with Willey.
164
CONCLUSION
When criticizing the new rules, it is easy to lose sight of the
sponsoring legislators. Representative Molinari, for example, was
undoubtedly sincere in her belief that these rules would protect
women and children. Yet, it was this sincerity and, arguably mis-
placed, sense of urgency that led the Congress to bypass the
Rules Enabling Act and to disregard the strong opposition to
these rules. Good intentions, like great cases, can make bad
law. '
65
The new rules in general, and Rule 415 in particular, are
bad law. I have only attempted to show the impact that the
unbridled admission of propensity evidence can have in a sexual
harassment suit. President Clinton's liability to Paula Jones, if
any, should turn on what happened in the hotel room in Arkan-
162. Imwinkelried, supra note 147, at 1146.
163. This hypothetical closing argument is an adaptation of the example
used by Professor Imwinkelried to illustrate the closing argument that could be
made in a criminal case under Rule 413. Other than the addition of the last
line, and small changes to adapt it to the civil context, the work is his. See id. at
1146-47.
164. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 361-62 (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("[The] danger is particularly great where .. . the extrinsic
activity was not the subject of a conviction; the jury may feel that the defendant
should be punished for the activity even if he is not guilty of the offense
charged.").
165. With apologies to Justice Holmes. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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sas in 1991, not on something that may have occurred in the
White House in 1993.
Moreover, if the new rules survive, they may herald the
beginning of the end for the exclusion of propensity evidence in
other areas. The case for admitting such evidence is strongest
when it is supported by empirical evidence. Statistics released by
the DOJ, which drafted the new rules, show that other types of
offenses have much higher recidivism rates.' 66 Perhaps, as has
been suggested, this is but the opening salvo in the campaign to
make character and propensity evidence generally admissible.
67
166. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
167. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 86, § 5412B.
